turn seriously threaten the social and economic situation of the black population. Alternatively, minority concentration in the military may reinforce the current low status of minorities, undermining black civilian prospects; if "too many" blacks continue to enlist, military service may begin to be viewed as the only fitting occupation for minority members.

To the extent that either of these scenarios seems likely—which is not to argue for the plausibility of either—it could be morally justified to limit black enlistments by explicit racial admissions quotas. Since any successful effort to restore racial balance will diminish black opportunities to serve, and because white policymakers may be disposed to magnify the seriousness of problems arising from black overrepresentation, it seems reasonable to set a high threshold of proof. Evidence of the deleterious effects of black overrepresentation must be strongly persuasive, if not compelling. But should this be the case, racial quotas in the military might be, not morally repugnant, but appropriate and justified.

These speculations are not designed to justify a quota policy for Army enlistments. In any event, such a policy would be impossible to implement under current recruiting conditions. The speculations have been aimed, rather, at sharpening our appreciation of the moral grounds for reviewing any efforts to restore racial balance to the military.

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**Book Review**


In 1651, Thomas Hobbes wrote that nations continually and inevitably find themselves "in the state and posture of gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms; and continual spies upon their neighbors." This posture is not an unfamiliar one to twentieth-century readers, although our pointed weapons are now nuclear, and our espionage, electronic.

A venerable tradition of political theory, extending from Hobbes, concludes from this grim picture that no international morality is possible among states; each is involved in an amoral war against all. In reaction to this tradition, an equally venerable response has developed. The behavior of states is indeed governed by moral principles, it is claimed, arising out of respect for their sovereign autonomy. These are the principles of non-intervention and national self-determination.

Political philosopher Charles R. Beitz, in Political Theory and International Relations, rejects both the Hobbesian view and its traditional alternative. In this rich and rewarding book, he argues for a third conception of international relations. International morality is possible, on Beitz's view, but its principles derive, not from the idea of state autonomy, but from the idea of justice. "Intervention, colonialism, imperialism, and dependence are not morally objectionable because they offend a right of autonomy, but because they are unjust."

Beitz closely examines Hobbes's account of international relations before rejecting it. According to Hobbes, nations necessarily behave amorally toward one another, each exclusively following its own national interest, because each nation knows that all the other nations are doing the same. Since there is no common authority constraining states to comply with any international morality, it is not in the interest of any state to follow moral rules. But on Hobbes's view, moral rules are legitimate only if they advance the interests of everyone to whom they apply. Hobbes concludes, therefore, that international morality is impossible.

This conclusion, however, presupposes a picture of international relations that Beitz shows to be increasingly false, if, indeed, it ever was true. It is not the case that nations have entirely independent and hostile interests, threatened by the prospect of any international cooperation. Instead, economically interdependent states cooperate extensively to meet domestic economic goals and achieve balanced economic growth. Certain rules of cooperation are binding on states, Beitz explains, because states have common interests.

If international morality is possible, what is its content? Beitz considers one dominant account: the first rule of international morality is respect for state autonomy—states are not to interfere in one another's domestic affairs. But what is the source of this right to state autonomy? Beitz asks? He answers that a state's right to autonomy is justified only by appeal to the rights and interests of its individual citizens. Persons, not states, are "ends in themselves," and states are legitimate only insofar as they respect their citizens' autonomy, only insofar as they are just. Thus Beitz rejects any absolute non-intervention principle: interference with just institutions is morally wrong; interference with unjust institutions, for the sake of increasing their justice, is not.

By emphasizing justice rather than autonomy, Beitz is able to resolve several perplexing problems about the scope of the right to self-determination.
Does self-determination apply to groups other than colonial populations—for example, to cultural minorities? Beitz replies: yes, if "independent statehood is a necessary political means for the satisfaction of appropriate principles of justice." Must the right of self-determination be satisfied by economic as well as political independence? The answer depends on whether economic independence in any given case promotes or impedes the growth of just institutions.

In the book's final section, Beitz presents his alternative to non-interventionist international morality. Traditional theories of justice, such as John Rawls's A Theory of Justice, have operated on the assumption that each state is a self-sufficient, internally cooperative venture, with the benefits and burdens of this cooperation to be distributed within state boundaries. This assumption Beitz has shown to be false: "national boundaries cannot be regarded as the outer limits of social cooperation"; benefits and burdens must be distributed globally. Beitz endorses a worldwide version of Rawls's redistributive "difference principle": "social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are...to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged." If this is a plausible principle of domestic justice (and Beitz does not argue here that it is), it is equally plausible as a principle of international justice. "If evidence of global economic and political interdependence shows the existence of a global scheme of social cooperation, we should not view national boundaries as having fundamental moral significance."

Given the cogency of Beitz's arguments, their strong redistributive implications for the foreign policy of affluent nations cannot be easily ignored.

—Claudia Mills

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