The economies of Central Europe are a shambles. The transition to more market-oriented economies in these countries will, in the short run, hurt a large number of people. But democracy, many hope, will legitimate these hard decisions.

This hope is not completely farfetched. Management studies show that when employees participate in making a decision, they are more likely to accept the results, instead of quitting or overusing sick days. Even convicted criminals support the system that convicts them more when they think the process is fair than when they merely get the outcome they want. On the national scale, too, faith in the democratic process can lead citizens to accept outcomes that hurt them as individuals.

Yet hopes for legitimating hard decisions through democracy can founder when practice doesn't live up to democratic ideals. And practice cannot live up to democratic ideals unless those ideals are better understood.

The Politics of Power and Persuasion

Democracy, as practiced in the United States and Western Europe, is a hybrid idea that incorporates conflicting assumptions. In one vision of democracy, the system creates fair procedures for resolving conflicts of interest; in another, it encourages deliberation about how best to promote the common good. Intellectuals in Central Europe are often quite aware of the difference between these two visions of democracy. In the German Democratic Republic, the New York Times reports a growing gap between “intellectuals and dissidents, who formed groups like New Forum with the notion of democracy as a process of well-meaning discussion in which the universal good was the shared goal, and the political parties in West and East Germany whose primary goal is to win the elections.”

Practicing politicians in the United States and Western Europe tend to understand democracy in only one of these two ways. For them, democracy is an adversary system that assumes conflicting interests and sets up fair procedural rules under which each side attempts to “win.” Political scientists in the West also describe politics in this way, as a matter of who gets what. This is the politics of power, not persuasion.

Yet American and European philosophers who discuss democracy usually emphasize its "deliberative" character. In deliberative democracy, citizens talk with one another about public problems. Their talk can be both raucous and constrained, conflictual and harmonious. It can turn on opinion as well as fact. It can draw on emotion as well as reason. It can help the participants think "we" instead of "I." While it does not rule out the possibility that the participants' interests fundamentally conflict, it aims at the creation of a common good. It works through persuasion, not power.

In fact, politicians in the West practice not only a politics of power but also, in some of their roles in the legislature, a politics of persuasion aimed at the common good. Recent research among political scientists is only now uncovering the extent of this common-interest behavior. While political rhetoric aimed at the common good often masks, whether consciously or through self-deception, both self-interest and the interest of a particular class or locality, previous analysts who prided themselves on their "realism" have simply failed to see the genuinely communal motivation that prevails in certain contexts.

The danger in the next few years is that the new governments of Central Europe will duplicate only the West's highly visible adversary institutions, premised on conflict and designed to "aggregate," or sum, individual preferences, and will ignore our less visible, but no less real, deliberative institutions. They may also ignore their own potential to develop new institutions that encourage a quality of citizen deliberation surpassing any known in the West.

The new governments thus have two tasks. They must act quickly to foster aggregative institutions that settle issues of fundamental conflict fairly, on the basis of one person, one vote. And they must also act to provide what is not so common in the West — extensive forums for deliberation, in which citizens have a voice in determining the common good.

Keeping Adversary Procedures Fair

To legitimate the hard choices ahead, Central European governments must first protect their new "aggregative" institutions from corruption through bribes, stuffed ballot boxes, and intentional recounts. Multiparty monitoring of elections, neutral investigative commissions, and swift, strong punishment for infractions will maintain confidence that the adversary procedure is fair.

More problematically, legitimacy in adversary democracy rests on the proposition that each citizen should count for one and none for more than one. Yet every democracy's formal aggregative process admits gross inequalities in power based on unequal economic and social resources. As a result, citizens at the bottom of the socio-economic scale often feel that, as one survey in the United States puts it, "People like me don't have any say about what the government does."

Free markets will soon give Central Europeans vastly different economic resources, and their social resources already differ dramatically. Democratic institutions will not have the same force of tradition behind them that they have in most Western democracies. If the countries of Central Europe cannot develop institutions that consciously guard against the excessive power of their new elites, they may find the legitimacy of their decisions severely undermined.

Central Europeans must also realize that majority rule works only in polities with many cross-cutting cleavages. When majority rule results in certain groups being outvoted again and again, democracies require corrective measures: proportional representation, federalism, and "consociationalism," i.e., the division of power and state-provided goods, like school and television time, in proportion to each group's percentage of the population. While such solutions do not provide equal satisfaction to ethnic and other minority groups, they still work better than winner-take-all majority rule.
Adversary democracy generates winners and losers. It therefore combines badly with state socialism, where there is only one arena in which to win or lose. As state socialist systems begin to adopt adversary democratic procedures, they need diversified political and economic systems, so that "apparatchiks" who lose in politics can become "entrepreneur-chiks" who win (or at least can win) in economics.

Indeed, moving toward adversary democracy means injecting large amounts of risk into previously risk-averse systems. The new governments in Central Europe will have to learn to live with uncertainty. But accepting uncertainty, losing control over outcomes, and being unable to guarantee the protection of one's personal interests will require from many citizens and bureaucrats an ideological, political, and psychological breakthrough.

Institutionalizing continual conflict requires tolerance of opposition parties. Yet after years of oppression by authoritarian systems, some activists in Central Europe and the Balkans think only of revenge. In countries like Romania, where most people with talent and administrative experience have collaborated in some way with the old system, that impulse toward revenge may breed a rhetoric of character assassination that is bound to erode trust and foster a common commitment to national goods. As one of my American friends concluded from talking with Romanians, "The decision rule there is what is good for Poland." Much of Solidarity operated in which elites determined public policy behind a facade of supposedly democratic institutions. Exposed to an array of charges and countercharges from the new democratic parties, Hungarian voters have already grown jaded. "All they do is make promises," says one worker. "And those advertisements on television, it's like a cabaret. I don't believe any of them."

To counter this legacy of pervasive cynicism, Western forms of aggregation through representation may have to be supplemented not only with the (mostly symbolic) devices of initiative and recall, but also with more participatory institutions, such as national and local referenda. Decentralizing decisions to the lowest possible level — instituting elections and referenda in schools, workplaces, villages, cities, and counties — would also provide experience in accepting conflict. As those who run in local elections and those who vote for them learn to lose on some issues but win on others, they should become more able to understand, and bear, losing nationally.

Fostering Deliberation

The procedural methods of adversary democracy are necessary to produce legitimate decisions in conditions of conflict. But they are insufficient to generate the individual transcendence of self-interest that hard decisions often require. Adversary democracy encourages participants to aim at winning rather than at finding a course of action that is best for the whole. It discourages listening. It lends itself to short time horizons.

Like an economic market, adversary democracy legitimizes the pursuit of self-interest. Voters pursue their individual interests by making demands on the political system in proportion to the intensity of their feelings. Politicians pursue their own interests by adopting policies that buy them as many votes as possible. While this system of "politics as marketplace" ensures accountability, it also mirrors — indeed, encourages — a larger materialism. Candidates and their policies become commodities, selling themselves or being sold.

The dynamic of adversary democracy has traditionally made democracies incapable of the kinds of sacrifices that Central European governments are now asking of their citizens. National unity and national sacrifice for long-run ends have instead often required a strong, even dictatorial, leader. Yet revolutionary movements demonstrate that citizens will sacrifice even their lives when they believe that their sacrifices are for the common good. That conviction can arise not only from devotion to a charismatic leader, but also from faith in policies arrived at through deliberation, which command the loyalty of those who participate in creating them.

Throughout their past struggles, many dissident groups in Eastern Europe held together through institutions that fostered a common commitment to national goods. As one of my American friends concluded from talking with members of Solidarity, "The decision rule there is what is good for Poland." Much of Solidarity operated by "felicitous" consensus, making decisions only after members had worked their way through a deliberative process that tried to encompass widely differing points of view. The experience produced unity in the struggle, widespread practical understanding of how to take many interests into account, and a consequent willingness to live with the results of decisions. This bottom-up practice in deliberative democracy may give Poland an edge over other newly democratizing nations in the use of democracy to make hard decisions.
Whenever possible, participatory institutions should bring together citizens of opposing views in circumstances that reward mutual understanding and the accurate gathering of information. Deliberation among intellectuals, or even elected representatives, is not enough. In the United States, theorists have accordingly proposed neighborhood and workplace assemblies, referenda requiring two distinct votes separated by a period of deliberation, and "policy juries" formed from representative samples of citizens—all institutional means of nourishing deliberation at its citizen roots.

Each nation must work out the deliberative innovations, and the mix of adversary and deliberative institutions, that fit its own patterns of cleavage, its own history, and its own culture. In the long run, deliberative processes may offer the best hope of finding ways to handle not only class conflicts, but also the ethnic disputes that threaten to split several of the newly democratizing nations in Eastern Europe. While "consociational" and federal solutions can produce reasonably just allocations among groups, shifting citizen perspectives from class or ethnic interests to a long-run common good requires the transformations of self that deliberative processes make possible.

Learning Not to Love Revolution
by George Friedman

For the past two centuries every revolution has wanted to serve as the model for all future revolutions. Since 1917, two regimes have laid claim to be the rightful heir of the revolutionary tradition. For most of that time, it appeared to reasonable observers that it was the Soviet Union that would serve as exemplar to the world. In a stunning reversal of fortunes, the Soviet model has fallen into disrepute, and most of the rebellious world appears to be taking its bearings from the American regime. It is the Statue of Liberty that moved the crowds in Peking and Prague rather than the Internationale.

While this is a very satisfying view of things, it should not be accepted too quickly. This is not because the American model is not superior to other models, but rather, because the world, and particularly those rising up against communist tyrannies, has not yet learned one of the fundamental teachings of the American revolution: Don't enjoy revolutions too much. They have not learned to expect only the bare necessities from politics and to seek the more sublime joys of life elsewhere.

Eastern Europeans still expect great things from revolution. Coming together in rebellion is seen as a great moment. They see their revolution as paving the way to a generally and radically improved human condition. This places them at odds with the modesty of the American revolution. In their great hopes for more than a mere "more perfect union," the crowds of Berlin and Prague still share much with their oppressors and less than they should with us. They understand revolution very differently from our founders; it follows that the sorts of regimes they will found will be very different from our own, and, I think, terribly inferior.

When Revolutions Are Young

There is a certain ineffable sweetness about revolutions when they are very young. In the beginning, when they strike out against tyranny, they are poems to decency and community, promises of radical simplification. They are odes to joy more than exercises in political theory or action. Consider the words of Schiller immortalized by Beethoven:

Joy, bright spark of divinity,
Daughter of Elysium,
Drunk with fire we walk in
Thy celestial holiness.
Thy spell reunites
What custom has divided,
All men become brothers
Under Thy lingering, gentle wings.

This poem and Beethoven's symphony are not incidental to politics. Beethoven wrote the Ninth Symphony with the French Revolution very much in mind. Perhaps more immediately relevant, the Ode to Joy movement of Beethoven's Ninth is the anthem of the European Community, the Community that the Eastern Bloc now very badly wants to join. Elysium was, in Greek mythology, the field on which the gods and those humans the gods favored, came together in peace and harmony. Schiller in his poem combines three themes. First, there is the promise of a pastoral redemption.